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Abstract 4 
The situation of small-scale coastal fisheries in Sierra Leone is dire, with diminishing fish stocks and fish sizes 5 
due to massive industrial fishing and widespread use of banned nets by artisanal fishers. Repeated attempts have 6 
been made by fisheries management to improve the situation, but with little or no success. Superficially, it might 7 
seem that the two main causes of the problem - foreign industrial fishing and damaging artisanal nets – could be 8 
readily dealt with, but closer analysis reveals that tackling these causes is immensely complicated. This is 9 
because their roots lie deep in Sierra Leone’s history, culture and politics, and any attempt to deal with them 10 
could lead to unintended consequences which might make the situation worse not better. Does this mean there is 11 
a ‘wicked problem’ here – i.e. a problem so intractable that it has no practicable solution? This is the issue 12 
which the present study addresses. The research is based on extensive fieldwork carried out in two large fishing 13 
coastal fishing communities in Sierra Leone (Tombo and Goderich) during April and May 2017 when 200 open-14 
ended questionnaires (SQs) were administered and 51 key informant interviews (KIs) were conducted. The 15 
study concludes that the situation faced by small-scale fisheries in these communities meets several, but by no 16 
means all, of the criteria of a wicked problem, and that while a definitive solution to the problem is unfeasible, 17 
stakeholders could adopt strategies to alleviate its more harmful consequences.  18 
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1 Introduction 20 
Threats to coastal fisheries are widespread across the world, none more so than in the region of west Africa, as 21 
Thomas (2017) notes: “the region’s marine resources are being depleted at alarming rates, mainly due to too 22 
many boats competing for too few fish. This … is a threat to millions of people in the region who depend on the 23 
oceans for their food” (Thomas, 2017, p.1). Similar assertions have been made by Mutume, 2002; 24 
Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), 2009; Vidal, 2012; EJF, 2016; and Bangura, 2017. Many writers 25 
blame foreign industrial fishing, which includes illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, for the 26 
depletion of west African fish stocks (Joaque, 2017; Seto et al, 2017; Finch, 2016; Belhabib et al, 2016). Arias 27 
and Pressey (2016, p.1) note that IUU fishing, also called ‘pirate fishing’, not only undermines the sustainability 28 
of marine resources, but also threatens food security and the “socio-economic stability of fishing communities”. 29 
To safeguard the economy of coastal communities some countries have banned or reduced the number of 30 
foreign trawlers that fish within their jurisdictions. For example, recent research in Indonesia by Cabral et al 31 
(2018) suggests that an outright ban on foreign trawlers could be the most sustainable way to reduce poverty and 32 
achieve food security in coastal communities. They report that Indonesia reduced fishing effort in its waters by 33 
25% as a result of forcibly curbing IUU fishing. Other writers blame the use of small mesh and monofilament 34 
nets by artisanal fishers for the decline in coastal fish stocks (Short et al, 2018; Thiao, et al, 2017) and some 35 
countries have banned these nets (Kamara, 2016; Ssebuyira, 2013). The present study uses both primary and 36 
secondary data to investigate whether a ban on foreign industrial fishing and/or small mesh and monofilament 37 
nets are practicable measures that could reverse the decline in fish stocks, improve food security, and reduce 38 
poverty in Sierra Leone’s coastal communities. Primary data for this study were collected from Tombo and 39 
Goderich, which are two major coastal fishing communities in Sierra Leone, while secondary data from the 40 
literature and documentary sources are used to provide the conceptual context (section 2: wicked problem) and 41 
the empirical context (section 4: case study) of the research. Section 3 explains the methods of data collection. 42 
The results of the primary data are presented in section 5. Sections 6 and 7 are the discussion and conclusions. 43 
2 Conceptual analysis of ‘wicked problem’ 44 
Following Rittel & Webber (1973), Peters (2017: 388) claims that the concept of wicked problems can be 45 
understood from the following ten characteristics: 46 
(1) “Wicked problems are difficult to define. There is no definitive formulation.47 
(2) Wicked problems have no stopping rule.48 
(3) Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but good or bad.49 
(4) There is no immediate or ultimate test for solutions.50 
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(5) All attempts to solutions have effects that may not be reversible or forgettable. 51 
(6) These problems have no clear solution, and perhaps not even a set of possible solutions. 52 
(7) Every wicked problem is essentially unique. 53 
(8) Every wicked problem may be a symptom of another problem. 54 
(9) There are multiple explanations for the wicked problem. 55 
(10) The planner (policy-maker) has no right to be wrong” 56 
 57 
Peters (2017: 388) adds an 11th characteristic – about politics: “that wicked problems involve multiple actors 58 
and are socially and politically complex”. Peters (2017: 388) also notes that the concept of a ‘super wicked’ 59 
problem adds a further four characteristics (Levin et al, 2012):  60 
(12) “Time is running out. 61 
(13) There is no central authority, or only a weak central authority, to manage the problem. 62 
(14) The same actors causing the problem seem to solve it.  63 
(15) The future is discounted radically so that contemporary solutions become less valuable”. 64 
 65 
In our view, the nine most salient of these 15 criteria are that wicked/super-wicked problems are complex and 66 
difficult to define; unique; symptoms of other problems; multi-caused; running out of time to be solved; have no 67 
clear solutions; or solutions that are impracticable or counter-productive; are faced by weak authorities; yet 68 
could be resolved by perpetrators. We shall argue that in the case of two coastal fisheries in Sierra Leone 69 
(Tombo and Goderich), three of these nine salient criteria do not apply: the nub of the problem is not difficult to 70 
pin down (diminishing fish stocks); the problem is not unique; and the situation is not so intractable that there is 71 
no clear solution. However, the other six salient criteria do apply: the problem is multi-caused; it is symptomatic 72 
of other problems in the country; there is a weak or indifferent or corrupt central authority; time is running out 73 
to deal with the problem; the most obvious solutions have serious side-effects; though a change in the behaviour 74 
by the perpetrators could help to alleviate the harm.   75 
3 Methods 76 
This study makes use of both qualitative and quantitative data. Between April and May 2017, 51 semi-structured 77 
key informant interviews (KIs) were conducted (26 in Tombo and 25 in Goderich); while 200 open-ended 78 
survey questionnaire (SQs) were administered of which 199 were returned (100 from Tombo and 99 from 79 
Goderich). All participants involved in the study were recruited through social networking.  Because relying on 80 
social networking to recruit participants can be problematic as respondents are more likely to recommend people 81 
who hold similar views to themselves, to encourage heterogeneity and obtain a variety of perspectives, a wide 82 
range of respondents was recruited by researchers investing a considerable amount of time finding people with 83 
different views. The KI respondents included four academics; 36 fishermen (including executives of fishers’ 84 
organizations; two councillors; three women fish sellers); three staff of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine 85 
Resources (MFMR); and three executives of the Sierra Leone Amalgamated Fisher’s Union (SLAFU). Out of 86 
the 36 fishers interviewed for this study, 18 were from Tombo and 18 from Goderich. All were artisanal fishers: 87 
regrettably, it was not possible to interview industrial fishers. Like the open-ended survey questions (SQs), 88 
interview questions probed into the nature of Sierra Leone’s fisheries and its management, including 89 
respondents’ perceptions of the current situation of SL fisheries, what has changed, and how this change 90 
happened over recent years. Interview questions for KIs were generally semi-structured to allow respondents the 91 
flexibility of reflection. Participants responded to these questions in their own ways, often through stories and 92 
‘life’ examples, opening up further issues, thereby providing both an extensive and in-depth account of Sierra 93 
Leone’s fisheries (Keeffe et al, 2016). The choice of Tombo and Goderich communities within Sierra Leone’s 94 
western region was made because of their importance and location: Tombo is rural and Goderich is urban; and 95 
they are the largest fishing communities in Sierra Leone. Table 1, which present results of the joint survey 96 
conducted by Sierra Leone’s Institute of Marine Biology and Oceanography (IMBO) and the Ministry of 97 
Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMRs) (cited in Thorpe et al, 2009) shows that besides harboring more 98 
vessels when compared to other fishing communities, both Tombo and Goderich have more fishers, full-time, 99 
part-time and migrant.  100 
Table 1: Description of Tombo and Goderich in relation to other fishing communities/landing sites within the 101 
Western region 102 
Location No of No of No of No of Kru Number of No of part- No of 
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Tombo 205 70 133 2 1118 205 21 
Goderich 190 26 138 26 1176 260 83 
Rokupa 59 2 57 0 225 109 0 
Old Wharf 55 0 47 1 180 24 1 
Moa 48 0 48 0 151 0 0 
Tokeh 43 5 38 0 129 0 0 
John Thorpe 38 0 38 0 150 94 0 
York 38 0 11 27 43 0 0 
Mama 
Beach 
36 0 23 13 91 5 64 
Kent 31 0 25 6 30 0 0 
Lumley 31 0 25 6 105 15 1 
Total 774 103 583 81 3398 707 170 
Source: Thorpe et al (2009). Ghana plank boats (which are defined as ‘semi-industrial’) have crews of 8-20; 103 
standard canoes have crews of 1-5; and Kru canoes are usually single-handed. 104 
The studies that describe small-scale fisheries (SSF) in Sierra Leone (Thorpe et al, 2009; Seto et al, 2015; 105 
Neiland et al, 2016;  Bangura, 2015; Campbell, 2016; Margai, 2016a;  and Kassam et al, 2016)  report that 106 
Tombo  and Goderich are very important fishing communities in the western region. Small pelagics like Herring 107 
(Sardinella maderensis) and Bonga (Ethmalosa Fimbriata) are the most common species caught in nets by local 108 
fishers from these communities (Kassam et al, 2016; Seto et al, 2015). These fishers also use hook and line to 109 
exploit demersal species like Gwangwan (Pseudotolithus spp). Comments in the open-ended survey 110 
questionnaires (SQs), were studied carefully and copied into a table according to themes, and into a second table 111 
based on the context in which these themes were used. Likewise, two types of tables were created from the KIs: 112 
the first to show the themes that were generated; and the second to show the context in which these themes were 113 
used. Data sets were analysed separately, and identified themes were then threaded together. Burnard et al 114 
(2008) describes the method of qualitative analysis used in this study as ‘thematic content analysis’, entailing 115 
the reading, re-reading, scrutinizing, identifying themes, and threading up of themes. For more clarity, the 116 
frequency of themes was set out in percentages using Microsoft Excel.  117 
4 Case study of small-scale coastal fisheries in Tombo and Goderich, Sierra Leone 118 
Sierra Leone is a very poor country. Indeed, according to the 2015 United Nations Development Programme 119 
(UNDP) Report, Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2011, a UNDP report on the 120 
Human Development Index (HDI) ranked Sierra Leone 180 out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2011). In 2017, a 121 
USAID report said Sierra Leone faces “alarming hunger with nearly 38 percent of children younger than five 122 
years of age suffering from chronic malnutrition” (USAID, 2017, p.1). In 2015, a UNDP report (UNDP, 2015) 123 
concluded that although Sierra Leone had made steady progress in human development, poverty continued to 124 
increase, and nearly 80% (4,724,000 people) of the country’s population were very poor (i.e., their families 125 
lived on no more than $1.2 per day); health facilities were substandard or non-existent in some communities; 126 
life expectancy was less than 43 years; and the educational system was grossly deficient.  Ozisik (2015) reported 127 
that the literacy rate was 43%; that school attendance rates were 40% for boys and 33% for girls; and that fewer 128 
than 60% of primary school teachers were trained.   129 
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In coastal areas, communities are becoming increasingly dependent on the fishing industry for food and 130 
employment. Sierra Leone’s civil war in 1991-2002 contributed to the rise of population in these communities 131 
as a search for security, food and sources of income pushed families into these areas (Behabib et al, 2018). In 132 
these communities, interest in fishing has surpassed farming, partly because the civil war badly affected 133 
farming, but also because, as Moriba et al (2011) said, poor roads discourage farmers as it is difficult to get their 134 
products to the market. A Republic of Sierra Leone report in 2009 about its poverty reduction strategy noted that 135 
farming is not popular among youths because of its labour intensive nature. Consequently, over 75% of coastal 136 
populations depend heavily on fishing (Thorpe et al, 2009): fishing is the lifeblood of Sierra Leone’s coastal 137 
communities (Seto et al, 2015; Neiland, 2016). However, although data on catches and landings are unreliable 138 
(Thorpe et al, 2008, Seto et al, 2017), it seems incontrovertible that fish stocks and sizes are declining. Most of 139 
the country’s fish stocks are “already fully exploited” or over-exploited (Vakily et al, 2012, p.34; FAO, 2006). 140 
The main causes of this decline are the increased numbers of fishers; the mainly ‘open access’ mode of fishing 141 
in these areas (Seto et al (2017); the steady rise in the number of foreign trawlers (Margai, 2016b); and artisanal 142 
fishers’ use of small mesh and monofilament nets.  143 
On industrial fishing, Sierra Leone’s foreign industrial fishing sector started during the 1950s when Italian 144 
vessels were the first to appear in the country’s waters (Thorpe et al, 2009). Between the 1950s and the 1980s, 145 
the number of foreign vessels fishing in the country’s waters increased significantly (Vakily et al, 2012), fuelled 146 
by an agreement signed between the Sierra Leone government and the USSR which allowed very large trawlers 147 
and factory vessels to fish in their waters (Thorpe at al 2009). Sierra Leone’s industrial fishery is overseen by 148 
the MFMR, which manages vessels from the neighbouring countries of Senegal and Ghana as well as vessels 149 
from Europe (especially Spain and Italy) and from Asia (especially Korea and China). The Fisheries 150 
Management and Development Decree of 1994 bestowed on the Director of Fisheries the power to make 151 
decisions about foreign vessels fishing in Sierra Leone’s waters. According to this Decree, before signing off 152 
foreign vessels, the Director has to take into account; (1) the total number of vessels already fishing; (2) the fish 153 
stock capacity; (3) the revenue to be derived from the contract and; (4) whether the vessel employs Sierra 154 
Leonean workers. The intention of the Decree is to prevent foreign fishing agreements from damaging Sierra 155 
Leone’s indigent fisheries. According to the 1994 Decree, if foreign vessels breach their contracts, their owners 156 
are liable to pay penalties, and the Director has the power to either suspend or cancel agreements. However, 157 
during the civil war (1991-2002), this 1994 Decree could not be enforced, and the country had to wait until the 158 
2003 Fisheries Policy to take control over the industrial fisheries sector. The 2004 Local Government Act 159 
transferred the management of artisanal fisheries, including the issuing of licence rights, from the MFMR to 160 
local councils, though the MFMR remains the official manager of the country’s fisheries including the artisanal 161 
sector and the industrial sector (Thorpe et al, 2009; EJF, 2016; Doumbouya et al 2017).  162 
The current situation regarding industrial fishing is that, partly as a result of the Ebola outbreak in 2014-16 163 
during which the enforcement authorities were quarantined (Doumbouya et al. 2017), the amount of IUU fishing 164 
has been growing.  According to Parminder Brar, World Bank (WB) Country Manager in Sierra Leone, despite 165 
efforts to curb them, the number of illegal industrial fishing vessels is continuing to increase (Margai, 2016b). 166 
Although the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) (2014) recorded that between 2010 and 2011 their efforts 167 
did help to reduce the number of IUU vessels, a later EJF report (2016, p.1) said the situation  might now be out 168 
of control as “sanctions fail to deter illegal operators operating internationally under the flag of Sierra Leone 169 
without the fisheries authorities' knowledge”. For many writers, the priority of the government should be to 170 
protect the artisanal sector by drastically reducing or eliminating industrial fishing in Sierra Leone’s waters. Part 171 
of the current study’s aim is to assess the extent to which a reduction in the number of IUU vessels would 172 
indeed increase fish stocks, thereby improve food security and reduce poverty in Sierra Leone’s coastal 173 
communities.  174 
On artisanal fishing, there is an issue over what it comprises. Some writers doubt whether the current method of 175 
fishing used by local fishers in Sierra Leone can be classed as ‘artisanal’ because they use not only traditional 176 
vessels like dugout canoes with hand-lines, cast nets and paddles (Vakily et al 2012) but also more modern 177 
vessels like large canoes with outboard engines (Thorpe et al 2009). Moreover, Dabo and Sesay (2012) report 178 
that like the industrial sector, SSFs now export their catch to several countries including neighbouring African 179 
countries. Nevertheless, while recognising that Sierra Leone’s artisanal fishery is a combination of very 180 
different scales and types of fishing (FAO, 2005), it is legitimate to differentiate it from industrial fishing.  181 
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According to Dabo and Sesay (2012), the artisanal fisheries sector contributes over 75% of the animal protein 182 
consumed in Sierra Leone. Neiland et al (2016), says it also provides about 500,000 full and part-time jobs for 183 
the country’s coastal communities, and so it clearly has the potential to generate significant household income, 184 
ensure food security and alleviate poverty in coastal communities. But the artisanal sector faces serious 185 
problems which threaten to undermine this potential. Chief among these problems is the damaging gear 186 
employed by artisanal fishers, including small mesh nets (even mosquito nets) and monofilament nets (Short et 187 
al, 2018; Vakily et al, 2012). Some reports single out foreign migrant fishers for particular blame. For example, 188 
Dabo and Sesay (2012), noting that 20% of national artisanal fish production is carried out by foreign migrants, 189 
claim that Ghanaian migrants target shark species in the Western Area and small pelagics in the Southern 190 
Province; Liberian migrants target small pelagics in the Southern Province; and Guinean migrants target small 191 
pelagics in the Northern Province. The MFMR has inadequate resources to tackle the many problems facing its 192 
artisanal sector, while the two main fishers’ organisations - Sierra Leone Artisanal Fishers Union (SLAFU) and 193 
Sierra Leone Amalgamated Fishers Union (SLAAFU) – lack the capacity to take part in a co-management 194 
system (Neiland et al, 2016, p.375). With very weak institutions, therefore, the problems facing Sierra Leone’s 195 
artisanal sector look set to continue. .  196 
5 Results 197 
The results of the fieldwork are divided into three subsections – industrial fishing; artisanal fishing; and the role 198 
of government.  199 
5.1 Industrial fishing  200 
In both Tombo and Goderich communities, industrial fishing was mentioned by SQs as the biggest problem 201 
facing these communities, and all 199 survey questionnaire (SQ) respondents from Tombo and Goderich believe 202 
that the complete removal or drastic reduction in the number of legal and the illegal industrial trawlers in their 203 
coastal waters would restore fish stocks, boost food security, and reduce poverty in their communities. Many 204 
KIs hold that industrial fishers (legal and illegal) are to blame because “before these trawler people started 205 
coming to our water, we did not have this type of problem” (KI-11, a Tombo fisherman). KI-9, another Tombo 206 
fisherman, says industrial fishing vessels damage his nets and destroy breeding grounds: 207 
“there are people in this country that benefit from industrial fishing. But we fishermen do not benefit 208 
from these industrial fishermen because they disturb us. They come inside the IEZ to fish and they 209 
destroy our nets. They are wicked and mad because they fish in estuaries where fish breeds: if the 210 
trawler comes trawling inside here it spoils the fish egg because this is a breeding zone. From Yoribar 211 
here to Kent up to Shenge is a breeding zone” 212 
KI-44, a fisherman from Tombo claims that when industrial fishers cut their nets it is financially crippling: 213 
“every fisherman in this community is now a debtor…if you do not borrow, how can you survive?” Most (80%) 214 
of KIs claim the activities of industrial fishers have reduced the quantity of fish in their waters forcing many of 215 
them (small-scale fishers) to travel far away from the EEZ (100% in Tombo) to look for fish (See Table 1). 216 
Table 1: Perceptions of artisanal fishers about industrial fishers 217 









Tombo  18 KIs 100% 100% 100% 
Goderich  18 KIs 83% 61% 100% 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 218 
KI-11, 16, 20 and 21 say that having to travel outside the EEZ means that small-scale fishers are forced to spend 219 
much more money on fuel: “I use more than 10 gallons of fuel plus the money for engine oil…I travel far away 220 
to look for fish” (KI-21, fisherman from Goderich)  221 
Surprisingly, respondents do not distinguish between legal and illegal industrial fishing. KIs-9, 4, 6 18, 31, 44, 222 
and 47 categorized legal and illegal industrial fishers as “these trawler people are the main problem that we are 223 
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having here in Tombo. As of now we are getting so many complaints of these ‘Chika Chonkas [type of industrial 224 
fishing vessel]” (KI-39, an executive member of SLAFU. However, respondents do make a distinction between 225 
industrial and semi-industrial fishing vessels which include Ghana plank boats. Industrial vessels are large 226 
trawlers with inboard engines; whereas semi-industrial vessels are smaller boats with outboard engines. For 227 
example, Korean speed boats are categorized as semi-industrial, as are the 5-10 Ghana plank boats with-40 228 
horse power outboard engines. Although the definition of a semi-industrial vessel is blurred - “this semi-229 
industrial sector is not well defined because when you talk about the artisanal, it could be the canoe people 230 
depending on the size “(KI-14, a researcher) – the category is nevertheless important because semi-industrial 231 
vessels enable owners to escape the restrictions imposed on industrial vessels. The semi-industrial sector is not 232 
well-organized, and has several different stakeholders, including greedy/poor fishermen, foreigners, and 233 
government. Some of the foreigners own cold-rooms where they preserve the fish that they buy from locals. 234 
There is an element of trans-shipment in their operations, which according to KI-6, can be done legally or 235 
illegally: 236 
“when people come to fish in our waters normally we would allow them to do what we call offshore 237 
transhipment. This means that you catch your fish, and because you want to export it you transfer it 238 
since the fishing boat will not go with the fish, but with the carrier vessel. This carrier vessel comes 239 
round to collect the fish, but to this they must have applied to our government for transhipment-our 240 
government sends their representatives there. The fish for our local market will be left in the fishing 241 
boat and the transhipped fish leaves for another country” 242 
According to KI-11, industrial fishers who are unable to access the EEZ, reincarnate themselves into semi-243 
industrial fishers working with small-scale fishers who register and manage bigger boats for these foreigners: 244 
“Foreigners don’t put their names down, but can use our fishermen who work under them. Anything that comes 245 
in they [small-scale fishers] hand it over to the foreigners: this is how they operate” (KI-11). K-16 (CMA 246 
executive) says the murky semi-industrial sector  247 
“has only created more problems…last year what I heard about them is that they have very large 248 
canoes operating between the industrial and artisanal. But it is a kind of fraud because their owners 249 
are still foreigners who go into arrangement with the local people to stand as the owners of the boat 250 
and then they [locals] pass their catch to the foreigners and they are paid. In the value chain that is 251 
another section that is unaccounted for” 252 
Moreover, there are allegations that this semi-industrial sector is corrupt, as many owners of boats classified as 253 
semi-industrial have special relationships with members of the government: “let me tell you something, I am 254 
made to understand that a good number of these boats [semi-industrial] are from the presidency” (KI-14, an 255 
executive of SLAFU). KI-3 (fisherman and CMA executive) claims that MFMR officials collaborate with the 256 
illegal semi-industrial sector in violating monitoring regulations, which is a breach of Sierra Leone law: 257 
“And you cannot believe that these Chika-Chonkas [illegal semi-industrial fishers] hold licences from 258 
the government, specifically from the Marine. These Chika-Chonkas are really disturbing us, we have 259 
been shouting, we have raised alarm times without number but it falls on deaf ears. It will interest you 260 
to know that even during the Ebola epidemic, a particular company was given the mandate to fish 261 
illegally from our water. If my memory can recollect well, X from MFMR was suspended indefinitely. X 262 
heads the corruption department in the marine...X collaborates with the ‘Chika- Chonkas...X knows 263 
about the systems in the ministry’s control office. X works hand in hand with foreign trawlers to switch 264 
off the devices in their vessels. Now when this is switched off, these vessels cannot be monitored from 265 
the Ministry because the Ministry will not receive any alarm. You can imagine such level of 266 
unfaithfulness and wickedness” (KI-3). 267 
A separate source claimed that X was suspended for accepting a bribe to permit some foreign vessels to fish in 268 
Sierra Leone’s EEZ. Allegations of another form of corruption perpetrated by the industrial fishery are made by 269 
KIs-4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 17, who claim that it originated in the EU’s discriminatory policies to prevent 270 
industrial vessels in Sierra Leone from selling their fish in EU markets on food hygiene grounds. KI-6 (a 271 
researcher) explains how the industrial fishery used deceitful methods to get round this ban: 272 
“one of the reasons that they say the fish from Sierra Leone is not allowed in the EU is very interesting. 273 
They said if the fish is caught at sea, not landed in Sierra Leone but taken straight to the EU, it is 274 
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acceptable. But if you land it in Sierra Leone, it becomes Sierra Leone fish and they will not accept it. 275 
...the latest development is that a company from Holland have come to Sierra Leone. They said that 276 
they can get us certification to sell our fish in the EU, if we pay 2.6 million Euros, but we do not know 277 
whether that will be possible. Sometimes our fish get to the EU as fish from Ghana, Senegal or 278 
elsewhere” 279 
KI-4 (a researcher) alleges that the Sierra Leone government was implicated in this scam: “They brought in one 280 
… when I came back and met them, I instantly knew it was not going to work. They worked out how much Sierra 281 
Leone was going to make if they export their fish to the EU and this was how our government fell for this. That 282 
is how the song went and up till today there is nothing to show for it” 283 
Also, KIs claim that scientific observers on board industrial vessels are bribed to turn a blind eye to illegal 284 
fishing: “they [observers] depend on foreign companies to pay them…it is a poor arrangement and this is the 285 
cause of this corruption that we are talking about” (KI-6, a researcher).  286 
“[They] do not report the truth because if they do, foreign companies will no longer sustain them and 287 
remember they [observers] are also in ‘survival mode’. The observers leave... foreign companies to do 288 
whatever they want for as long as they sustain them – give them money to support themselves and their 289 
families” (KI-14, a SLAFU executive)  290 
However, some respondents defend the (legal) industrial sector. For example, KI-4 (a researcher) asserts that it 291 
is well-organised; keeps good records; and provides revenue for the government: “It is industrial fishing that 292 
gives revenue to this country. It is much better organized than the artisanal fishing. The industrial sector has 293 
people who take detailed records of the catch, the time it was caught, the species, everything is well 294 
documented” 295 
KI-6 (a researcher) says the contribution to the country’s revenue made by the industrial fishery sector is 296 
considerable:  297 
“the industrial sector is contributing foreign exchange for the country, we know for instance that a tuna 298 
vessel pays something like 45,000 dollars per year. From the time we started checking vessels with 299 
monitoring devices, in 2010 to last year, revenue collection for this sector has moved from 6 million 300 
Leones a year to 57 billion Leones per year, which is a very big jump in terms of money collected from 301 
the fisheries sector. So fisheries is now one of the three [highest] revenue earners for government” 302 
5.2 Artisanal fishing   303 
Artisanal fishing is also heavily criticized for contributing to the decline in fish stocks and sizes. Over 20% of 304 
KIs think poverty among fishers in Tombo and Goderich is mainly caused by small-scale fishers using illegal 305 
‘mina’ (small) nets to catch baby fish, and monofilament nets which do not biodegrade when abandoned but 306 
continue to entangle fish. KI-15, an official at MFMR, says: “we have been trying to tackle illegal fishing in the 307 
industrial and artisanal sector. Before we were concentrating on the industrial, but later we discovered that the 308 
artisanal fishery is very bad here. Our fishermen do illegal fishing as much or even more than the industrial 309 
people”. 310 
KI-4 (a researcher) complains that   311 
 “the management for now compared to the past is not good. Now fishing is not controlled, we have 312 
many irresponsible methods of fishing. Our fishermen fish baby fish, they use all manner of fishing 313 
gears and methods, there is no control. During my fishing days our fishermen fished with good nets but 314 
now our fishermen use any type of net”.  315 
Some KIs allege that the government turns a blind eye to these breaches of regulations by artisanal fishers in 316 
return for their votes in elections. KI-7 (CMA executive from Goderich) states: 317 
“you know it is bad fishing that sustains our people and should our government dare to stop it, I bet 318 
you, they [government] will lose during elections. Fishing is where everybody in Tombo earns their 319 
living. If government stop people and do not provide an alternative, our people will vote them out. The 320 
previous government because of votes encouraged channel fishing which destroys fish eggs” (KI-7) 321 
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KI-23, a fisherman, says “you can fish anything; all that our government want is your vote” (KI-23). KI-5, an 322 
official at MFMR, notes that this makes apprehending deviant artisanal fishers very difficult:  “politicians have 323 
told people not to listen to the marine…sometimes when vessels are impounded or canoes owned by artisanal 324 
fishermen or even gears, we [the marine], just get calls from the big men ordering you to release those things to 325 
their owners” 326 
Part of the problem is that there is very little monitoring of artisanal fishing activity. Although “managers 327 
collect records of how many boats are going out”, there is no attempt to “collect these information from them 328 
and encode them, interpret them and use them...the question is if we do not use this information why then do we 329 
collect them?” (KI-4, a researcher). Moreover, neither catches nor landings are routinely recorded for the 330 
artisanal sector. KI-9 and KI-22, who are harbour masters for wharfs in Tombo and Goderich, note that their 331 
work is not to take stock of catches or landings, but to check details of boats that leave their wharfs and to 332 
resolve conflicts between fishers. KIs 5, 6, 13 and 15 say it is difficult to determine the amount of fish taken by 333 
small-scale fishers because there are no offices for enumerators to work in at these landing sites: “we have not 334 
got adequate funding to have a random distribution of enumerators, if not in all the landing sites, at least along 335 
the major landing sites, so that we are able to do the statistics that will show landing sites for catches” (KI-6, a 336 
researcher). 337 
Another part of the problem of artisanal fishers is the failure of their fisher organizations, which are supposed to 338 
mediate between fishers and government. First, there is a bitter conflict between the original fishers’ 339 
organization, SLAFU, and the breakaway rival fishers’ organization, SLAAFU. Thirteen of the 18 KIs from 340 
Tombo and six of the 18 KIs from Goderich traced the establishment of SLAAFU to the ‘corruption in the 341 
SLAFU’. But according to KI-35, SLAAFU itself has achieved nothing: 342 
“it is because of a clash of interest that they left SLAFU and then formed the SLAAFU. Everybody 343 
wants to be the number one, I should be the top, I should be the leader, and all these problems caused 344 
the division. Whenever fishermen want to do anything you can see how much people struggle to lead. I 345 
do not value the SLAAFU, they are just there doing nothing”. (KI-35, fisherman from Goderich).  346 
Second, SLAFU has been accused of mismanagement in that it fails to inform its members how it is spending 347 
their subscriptions. KI-41, a fisher from Goderich, says “we pay dues but we do not know what the [SLAFU] 348 
leaders do with this money”. KI-15, an official at MFMR, explains that in Tombo, SLAFU are in charge of 349 
artisanal ‘manifesto’ fees given to the harbour master, but they have misappropriated the fees: “There is a clash 350 
right now at Tombo, you know if you want to go to the sea, as a fisherman there is a certain amount of money 351 
that you give to the harbour master and the SLAFU were in charge of the fund and so they misused it.”  352 
A SLAFU executive (KI-1) refuted this charge, and instead accused SLAAFU of bribing MFMR to allow its 353 
members to fish illegally:  354 
“Channel fishing is of course the most dangerous one, most illegal one that is not challengeable 355 
anywhere. The challenges against Channels are very great in this country. We (SLAFU) try to stop 356 
them, but the politicians will not agree. I am not here to talk about any other union, but our SLAFU. 357 
SLAAFU, the amalgamated union, said they were against illegal fishing, but their members were 358 
Ghanian and Channel fishermen...If they [the government] were really fighting illegal fishing, would  359 
they back a group like SLAAFU? SLAAFU support Channel fishers because they pay their dues to 360 
them, they pay huge money and then SLAAFU gets enough to settle the people at the ministry and then 361 
they keep quiet” 362 
An additional complication is the existence of the Community Management Associations (CMAs) which were 363 
established during the first phase of the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (WARFP) to reform artisanal 364 
fisheries in Sierra Leone. Many respondents are highly critical of the CMAs, saying, for example, there are 365 
divisions between executives and between members; there is discrimination against migrant fishers; there is 366 
little action taken against illegal fishing; and CMAs lack resources to fulfil their responsibilities. KI-3 (a CMA 367 
executive from Tombo), accuses some CMAs executives of illegal fishing. KIs- 1, 17, 22, 23, and 16 claim 368 
some CMA leaders are government agents using the CMA to lure artisanal fishers with bribes during 369 
electioneering periods. A SLAFU representative asserted that the CMA was created to undermine SLAFU: 370 
“the CMA was formed to destroy our organization because most CMA members were already our 371 
members and now we cannot control the CMA executives that use bad fishing methods...most sections 372 
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of the CMA are not functioning because their leaders are bad fishermen and let me tell you, some of 373 
their leaders are government agents” (KI-1). 374 
Nevertheless, many respondents affirm that the contribution made to food security by artisanal fisheries is huge 375 
– partly because of open access fishing:  376 
“fish is affordable: accessible and affordable to all. I have been to places where people don’t have 377 
money but every day the women can go to the streams, inland valley swamps and come home with 378 
something to cook. This is to say that every day, they deposit their fishing traps or they go with their 379 
scoop nets. Through this means, they always have fish for their homes. They are able to access fish 380 
because we have what we call ‘open access fishing’. You do not need to have a licence to be able to 381 
fish in those places” (KI-6, a researcher)  382 
-  and partly because of handouts from generous fishers: “the poorest person from our community eats fish every 383 
day, except when we [fishermen] do not catch fish. These poor people come to the wharf with plates and we give 384 
them fish… they beg and we give them” (KI-16, fisherman and CMA executive).  385 
However, respondents like KI-22, 26, 37, 47, and 51 note that fishers only give out small-sized fish which are 386 
mostly leftovers - “after selling whatever is remaining is what I give people. I first sell the fish that has more 387 
value like the bigger ones” (KI-37, fisherman from Goderich) – and that while it is true that almost every family 388 
in Tombo and Goderich does have fish to eat, they remain in poverty: “whether you like it or not we are still 389 
very poor…in fact to the extent that our local fishermen cannot afford to pay [for a boat] licence fee. Where will 390 
money come from for development?” (KI-7, a CMA executive).  391 
5.3 Role of government 392 
Respondents allege that the position adopted by the government is opaque. KI-3, a fisher and CMA executive 393 
from Tombo, claims that “no organization understands what our government is doing”. The government is 394 
constantly lobbied by both the industrial sector and the artisanal sector, and by foreign consultants who take 395 
opposing sides. For example, the World Bank (WB) takes the side of the industrial sector, emphasizing the 396 
government’s responsibility to obtain revenue and foreign currency; whereas the UN Food and Agriculture 397 
Organization (FAO) takes the side of the artisanal sector, emphasizing the government’s responsibility to 398 
guarantee food security. KIs-5, 6, 14 and 15 note that foreign consultancies differ about whether the country’s 399 
fisheries should be channeled towards wealth creation or food security: “as a nation we are concerned about 400 
creating wealth, but we are also concerned about food security and that is the perspective of the FAO. But the 401 
WB is saying that if people can make more money they can use the money to buy other sources of protein” (KI-402 
6).  403 
The fact is that the government is pushed from pillar to post by external foreign experts (EFEs) who are 404 
criticized by respondents for preying on government; persuading government to fund failed projects; 405 
transmitting knowledge not consistent with the reality of fisheries in Sierra Leone (33% of KIs); creating 406 
discord between local researchers and experts (15% of KIs); making recommendations that leave the MFMR in 407 
a state of confusion; wasting valuable resources; and possibly being part of illegal fishing agreements (55% of 408 
KIs). The MFMR is also criticised by respondents for being constantly in flux; failing to implement regulations 409 
at either industrial or artisanal levels; having inadequate power and resources to manage the country’s fisheries 410 
(74% of KIs); and unaware of the future direction of its fisheries (60% of KIs).  411 
 6 Discussion 412 
With regard to the problems faced by the SSF sector in Sierra Leone’s coastal waters, while this study regards 413 
the responses expressed in interviews by fishers and other key informants as valuable records in themselves of 414 
stakeholders’ subjective perceptions about the way the coastal fisheries are functioning, the researchers 415 
recognise that some respondents make factual claims that may be challenged. For example, several fishers claim 416 
that before the advent of the industrial fishery, their fishing was much more successful. From our research, it 417 
seems that this claim is valid. Also, some respondents allege there is corruption in the semi-industrial sector as 418 
vessel owners have personal inks with members of the government. This allegation is hard to verify through 419 
official channels, but it appears to be common knowledge among fishers. Assertions about a food hygiene scam 420 
with the EU in which the SL government was involved were made by very experienced and knowledgeable KIs, 421 
who are in a position to know. Respondents’ claims that observers on board large-scale fishing vessels turn a 422 
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blind eye to breaches of fisheries regulations were so frequent that it is difficult to discount them. Likewise, 423 
accusations that the government allow artisanal fishers to use illegal nets in return for their votes for the ruling 424 
party at the next election were made by fishers with first- hand experience. Fishers’ claims that both SLAFU and 425 
SLAAFU were guilty of corruption may owe something to bitter rivalry between these organisations, but there 426 
were some whistle-blowers within each organisation. Finally, there were so many criticisms of CMAs for 427 
inefficiency, hypocrisy, and corruption, including from ex-members, that it is difficult to ignore them        428 
Turning to respondents’ perceptions of ways to address these problems, as section 5 shows, the over-fishing 429 
caused by industrial fishing in the coastal waters of Sierra Leone is perceived by respondents as a major threat to 430 
the health of several important fish stocks. However, it is not at all clear that a ban on industrial fishing would 431 
eliminate that threat. It is true that there are claims that anti-industrial fishing polices have worked in other parts 432 
of the world (Bailey, 1997; Cabral et al, 2018), but the small-scale fisheries in Sierra Leone suffer from complex 433 
problems, and an outright ban on foreign trawlers that fish in its waters may be a knee-jerk, temporary, 434 
superficial or simplistic solution for a very intricate problem, and could worsen the situation. For example, a ban 435 
could lead to foreign companies transferring their investment to the artisanal sector and replacing foreign 436 
industrial vessels with indigent semi-industrial vessels, thereby continuing their unsustainable level of over-437 
fishing. Or it could result in the banned vessels continuing to fish illegally without observers and with their 438 
monitoring systems turned off, as is the case in other West African countries. Moreover, there are already 439 
several semi-industrial vessels owned and run by Sierra Leoneans: are advocates of a ban on industrial fishing 440 
suggesting that these indigent vessels be banned along with foreign vessels? Such a move would be very 441 
difficult politically. Furthermore, the banning of legal industrial vessels would deprive the government of much-442 
needed revenue in foreign currencies such as the EU euro, the Chinese yuan, and the South Korean won. 443 
Finally, the government has insufficient resources to enforce a ban on foreign industrial vessels.  444 
Section 5 also shows that artisanal fishing methods are highly destructive of fish populations in the inshore 445 
waters of Sierra Leone. However, it is not at all clear that more effective enforcement of the bans on small mesh 446 
nets and monofilament nets would solve the problem, because although this might be necessary for the long-447 
term survival of fish stocks, in the short-term it would jeopardise the livelihood and food security of thousands 448 
of artisanal fishers and their families in the coastal regions of Sierra Leone. It would also have severe political 449 
consequences for the governing regime as disaffected fishers would desert the ruling party at the next election. 450 
In any case, it is a purely theoretical solution because the government does not have the resources to enforce 451 
such bans.  452 
Do these considerations show that the problems small-scale fishers face in Tombo and Goderich are so deep-453 
rooted and intractable that they constitute a wicked problem for which there is no practicable solution? The 454 
answer to this question is mixed, since three of the nine salient criteria of wicked/super-wicked problems listed 455 
in section 2 do not apply to the Tombo and Goderich cases, but the other six do apply. The three salient criteria 456 
that do not apply to Tombo and Goderich are, first, that the problem is difficult to define, which does not apply 457 
to Tombo or Goderich because there is clear evidence of a continuous decline in fish stock levels and sizes in 458 
both sites. Second, the criterion that the problem is unique does not apply to Tombo and Goderich because such 459 
declines in fish stock levels and sizes are experienced in many coastal areas in the region and across the globe. 460 
Third, the criterion that the situation is so intractable that there is no clear solution does not apply to Tombo and 461 
Goderich, since their situations (in our view) are not (yet) irredeemable.  462 
The six salient criteria of wicked/super wicked problems that do apply to Tombo and Goderich are, first, that 463 
many factors contribute to the damage caused by industrial and artisanal fishing, including, in the case of 464 
industrial fishing, the power of foreign companies owning large trawlers supported by their own governments; 465 
and in the case of artisanal fishing, the lack of alternative forms of employment or of food sources. Second, the 466 
criterion that the problem is a symptom of another problem applies to Tombo and Goderich because harmful 467 
industrial fishing and artisanal fishing are symptomatic of endemic corruption in Sierra Leone. Third, the 468 
criterion of weak central government applies, because the Sierra Leonese government lacks the political will or 469 
authority to deal with the SSF problem. Fourth, the criterion that time is running out, applies to Tombo and 470 
Goderich since fish stocks are declining so fast that there is a danger of the economic extinction of some 471 
species.  Fifth, the criterion of side effects applies to Tombo and Goderich because the most obvious solutions 472 
(banning industrial fishing and enforcing the bans on damaging artisanal gear) have major political 473 
consequences. Sixth, the criterion that the actors who cause the problem can solve it, applies to Tombo and 474 
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Goderich in the sense that industrial fishers could stop their excessive fishing effort and illegal fishing, and 475 
artisanal fishers could stop using small mesh and monofilament nets.        476 
7 Conclusion 477 
The conclusion of this study is that the difficulties experienced by the small-scale coastal fisheries in Tombo and 478 
Goderich constitute a problem that satisfies six of the nine salient criteria for defining a wicked/super-wicked 479 
problem. The most worrying feature of ‘wickedness’ is that there seems to be no political will on the 480 
government’s part to confront the perpetrators of the most damage to the fish stocks, including the owners of the 481 
foreign industrial vessels and the leaders of the artisanal fishers. However, some respondents are more 482 
optimistic than this, and have recommended some steps that might help to alleviate the situations in Tombo and 483 
Goderich. One such suggestion is for fishers’ groups and other organisations to iron out their differences and 484 
work together:  “if we can put aside our grievances and differences, it will be good for us because our 485 
generations yet unborn will have something to fall back on. They will say we have worked for them. There is 486 
need for all organizations working around fisheries to come together to rebuild our fisheries” (KI-20, a 487 
fisherman)  488 
Another suggestion is for environmental education to teach both industrial and artisanal fishers that their current 489 
behaviour is not sustainable, and that they must acknowledge the need to give up the most destructive fishing 490 
techniques such as heavy trawling in inshore areas and the use of small mesh nets. A third suggestion is for self-491 
help initiatives by fishers to provide practical solutions to particular problems such as rotting fish. For example, 492 
fishers could appeal to international charities to fund solar-powered cold storage units which would keep surplus 493 
fish caught during good fishing days fresh for distribution on poor fishing days. There is an important role for 494 
the government in encouraging such moves, not by coercion or economic incentives, but by moral suasion, 495 
nudging, and leading by example. But the essence of these suggestions is that stakeholders take collective 496 
responsibility for the coastal fishery and stop blaming other people or organizations for the predicament that 497 
faces them. This approach is less to find a definitive solution to the problem than to chip away gradually at its 498 
most harmful consequences. Further research is needed into the practicability of such incremental steps.  499 
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